New chancellor, old constraints

FRIEDRICH Merz received a rude shock on the morning of May 6, 2025, as he prepared to drop the "in-waiting" qualifier from his title as German chancellor.

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After weeks of negotiations following February's federal election, Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU) had forged a coalitional pact with the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), securing a narrow 13-seat majority in the 630-member Bundestag. Yet Merz still failed to ratify his chancellorship on the first vote, with 18 coalition members voting against him.

Though ultimately elected on a second ballot, the initial "no" vote was unprecedented for an incoming chancellor in the postwar federal republic. Some insiders blamed conservatives opposed to Merz's proposed relaxation of German fiscal rules. Beyond the immediate embarrassment, the vote signalled a deeper fragility in Merz’s leadership and Germany's political culture. As a scholar of German politics and author of a forthcoming book on state traditions and governance, I view these problems as deeply rooted in Germany's historical and institutional context.

The stakes in Merz's confirmation could hardly have been higher. Europe and Germany face mounting crises, from Russian aggression to uncertain U.S. commitments to NATO. As SPD parliamentary leader Jens Spahn noted before the vote, "All of Europe, perhaps the whole world, is watching this ballot.”

Merz has pledged strong leadership and a major increase in defense spending to build "the strongest conventional army in Europe." He aims to counter threats from Russia and offset American ambivalence toward European defense.

This ambitious vision, however, is constrained by Germany's "debt brake,” enacted after the 2008 financial crisis. The law caps annual deficits at 0.35% of GDP and prohibits borrowing by German regions ("Länder").