Limits of overt force and why India needs a covert anti-terror programme

The blast outside Delhi's Red Fort on 10 November, which killed thirteen people, has once again thrust India into a familiar strategic dilemma: even ifinvestigators establish an undeniable link to Pakistan-based handlers or Jaish-e-Mohammad, what can India realistically do in response?

- ABHINANDAN MISHRA

A blast outside Delhi's Red Fort on Nov 10 killed thirteen people

Initial investigations already suggest such links.

Yet for any country confronting state-sponsored terrorism, the menu of viable responses is far narrower than the public often imagines.

When the source of terrorism lies across a nuclear-armed border and within a state ecosystem that protects, enables or even nurtures terror groups, the room for overt retaliation shrinks further. India knows this problem intimately.

Operations like the 2016 surgical strikes or the Balakot airstrike delivered strong messaging value, but they also came with high strategic cost: heavy resource mobilization, risk to personnel and assets, potential escalation spirals, and limited long-term deterrence, given that the targeted groups typically regenerate quickly under state protection.

India’s recent Operation Sindoor again demonstrat ed capacity and resolve, but it also underscored a truth policymakers rarely say out loud: this cannot become the response template every time a terrorist attack takes place. Even successful tactical operations don’t necessarily shift the strategic landscape.

Repeating the same playbook invites predictability, which adversaries exploit.