At the pleasure of the government?

Unlike government servants, arm’s-length regulators need protection from Executive interference, as recent US events warn

- AARTHIKAM CHINTANAM

Recent reports from the United States indicate that President Donald Trump has attempted to fire Governor Lisa Cook of the Federal Reserve. This action is unprecedented and has prompted a lawsuit from Ms Cook, who has refused to step down. The legality of the move is being (apparently successfully) challenged, as the law allows the President to remove a governor only “for cause”. The Trump Department of Justice had earlier initiated a criminal investigation against her, and Mr Trump has claimed that’s sufficient grounds to sack her.

These events serve as a timely reminder of a foundational principle of governance in democracies, namely the separation of powers and its obverse, checks and balances. While this spectacle is uniquely American, the underlying debate it ignites — about democratic accountability versus institutional autonomy — is one that resonates deeply in India.

The notion that “democratic accountability” justifies conferring such unfettered power on the Executive is not just incorrect, but also shows inadequate understanding of modern structures of governance. Before looking at the modern structures, it is useful to note that in India we have built a constitutional framework that is designed to prevent such concentration of power.

Our system recognises distinct and separate spheres of authority, each with its own forms of accountability. The Executive is accountable to the Legislature, which in turn is accountable to the people through elections. The Judiciary, a separate branch, is accountable for its actions through a rigorous, if sometimes slow, process of judicial review and, in extreme cases, parliamentary impeachment. The Executive's power to appoint judges does not extend to the power to remove them at whim. This crucial distinction is the very essence of judicial independence.