China and the post-American order

Pax Britannica ended not because Britain wanted it to, but because it could no longer afford its empire. Pax Americana is unravelling for the same reason: America cannot command the global economy, the institutions, or the narrative as it once did.

- B.R. DEEPAK

When Xi Jinping rolled out tanks and drones at a thunderous parade in Beijing on September 3, it wasn’t just a show of military hardware. The messaging was loud and clear: It is the twilight of Pax Americana and the dawn of Pax Sinica, marked by the ascendancy of emerging powers. Xi Jinping declared from the rampart of the Tian’anmen that the Chinese nation is “never intimidated by any bullies” (不 畏强暴)… Today, humanity again has to choose between peace and war, dialogue and confrontation, win-win cooperation and zero-sum game.”

It is hardly surprising that US President Donald Trump and his close associates reacted with indignation, denouncing the bonhomie between Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as a conspiracy directed against the United States. On September 5, Trump further remarked, “It looks like we have lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China.” This was in response to the bonhomie displayed by Russia, India and China (RIC) in Tianjin during the SCO Summit.

India has also been subjected to sharp criticism from officials such as Peter Navarro and, more recently, US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who warned India to “stop purchasing Russian oil, withdraw from BRICS, and support the United States and the dollar, or face a 50 per cent tariff.” In a notable reversal, on September 7, President Trump declared, “India and the United States have a special relationship; there is nothing to worry about.” Such inconsistency underscores a departure from the more predictable patterns that traditionally characterized US foreign policy. Or is it a reflection of US paranoia over China’s rise, which is increasingly casting a shadow over the so-called American century?