Is Progress Possible In Philosophy?

Mathis Bitton suggests three ways that philosophy progresses.

- Mathis Bitton

It is often said that philosophy is deprived of the possibility to progress because, unlike science, it cannot accumulate knowledge. But to say that progress is a mere addition of discoveries is to misunderstand the concept. Even in science, progress is far from a linear amassing of theories; scientific history is filled with contestations, revolutions, and redefinitions. The human sciences also defy the linear progress idea. From Durkheim to Weber, from Saussure to Chomsky, it is evident that progress in sociology, linguistics, or even psychoanalysis sciences is neither linear nor cumulative. Rather, it manifests itself through the refinement of analytic techniques, interpretations, and reflections.

A similar posture could be adopted for philosophy. Philosophy does not consider past concepts as obsolescent, or even as able to become obsolescent. We still philosophise around the notion of God; but not in the same way that our predecessors did. This implies two principles: on the one hand, philosophical reflection is trans-historical; on the other hand, the reproblematisation of philosophical questions is in constant evolution. This means that philosophical progress can emerge in three different forms: by extra-philosophical necessity; by totalisation and accumulation; and by dialectical interiorisation and exteriorisation. I want to briefly consider these three options here.

Progress By Extra-Philosophical Necessity

A first way to deny philosophical progress would be to say that the program of science and the march of history do not affect philosophy itself. But they do.