Revisiting the Ontological Argument

Raymond Tallis contends that a definition of God cannot necessitate God's existence.

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Regular readers of this column will know that Tallis is a secular humanist, and that his Wonderland is a godless place.

He explained why he was an atheist nearly a hundred wanders-in-Wonderland ago ('Why I am an Atheist', Issue 73), at a comparatively happy time (2009 CE) when few of us had heard of Donald Trump or Covid. So why is God popping up yet again, only a short while after he discussed the 'God of Limited Power' ('Excusing God', Issue 168)? Has he had a revelation, or encountered an argument that has changed his mind on this the most important of issues?

There has been no such event. Instead, I stumbled upon a characteristically brilliant episode of BBC Radio 4's In Our Time, wonderfully facilitated by Melvyn Bragg. Originally broadcast over a decade ago, it was devoted to the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. I mention the programme because I suspect that by spreading the word about In Our Time, I might thereby contribute to enlightening readers (even?) more than simply by means of my reports from Wonderland.

The Ontological Argument is not, of course, a stranger to this journal. For instance, in Issue 152, Peter Mullen beautifully summarised Anselm's famous version of the argument, the arguments against his argument, and the counterarguments mobilised in its defence. So why, apart from the accidental encounter with In Our Time, do I think it is worthwhile revisiting this issue? Because it is, as Mullen said, "in and of itself a paradigm of philosophy. The Ontological Argument - whichever side you find yourself on - is an example of what, at its best, philosophy is." I want to support this claim by looking at places the argument might take us to, irrespective of whether or not it delivers what it says on the tin.

Anselm's Ontological Argument can be put briefly as follows:

a) God is by definition the most perfect being.