Revisiting India's Nuclear Doctrine

In its manifesto for 2014 general elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has promised to review India’s nuclear doctrine. But does India really have a proper nuclear doctrine in strict sense of the term? Not really. Therefore, it is time to have one

- Prakash Nanda

Answering a question at a bookrelease function on November 10, 2016, the then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar counter-questioned why the country’s policy of “No First Use” (NFU) of its nuclear weapons should not change. Many analysts overreacted by saying that India had changed its nuclear doctrine.

The problem with these reactions was that those were based on a halftruth. Parrikar was asking a question, not answering. The other half of the truth was that in the same counterquestion, Parrikar had made it absolutely clear that what he was saying was his personal opinion and that it was not the viewpoint of the government of India. He had reiterated that India’s nuclear policy remained unchanged under the Modi government. 

Global arrangements or regimes are based on the declared policies of the governments of the member-states, not on the individual pronouncements of ministers and ruling party members. In fact, in its manifesto of the 2014 general elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had promised to review India’s nuclear doctrine. But has it prevented countries like Australia, Canada and now Japan entering nuclear pacts with the Modigovernment?

However, in my considered view there are enough reasons why the Modi government should go for a formal review of the country’s NFU policy. Let me explain why. In the strict sense of the term, India does not have a proper nuclear doctrine. It is, perhaps, a part of our strategic culture  to keep things and policies as ambiguous as possible, leaving them to many and different interpretations.