Was De Gaulle right about US-Europe relationship after all?

The transatlantic alliance, De Gaulle argued, should be a partnership of equals, not a strategic appendage of Washington's whims.

- SANTISHREE DHULIPUDI PANDIT

Was Charles de Gaulle simply ahead of his time? Decades ago, the French President famously pulled France out of NATO's integrated military command, insisting that Europe must not be subservient to American strategic whims and diktats. He astutely warned against undue US interference in European affairs, advocating instead for an autonomous European defence architecture. Back then, his stance was seen as controversial, even eccentric. Today, it seems almost prophetic.

The Western alliance—once hailed as a community of shared values, united by democracy, liberalism, and imagined cultural solidarity against communism—visibly reveals sore faultlines. The rise of Trumpism has thrown into sharp relief what de Gaulle foresaw—an overt reliance on an America that, when it decides to, may turn its back on global responsibilities with astonishing swiftness and convenience. Under Trump, these fissures have widened. With his sledgehammer-styled foreign policy, he stripped away diplomatic niceties and exposed a West that no longer stands united in purpose or strategy.

De Gaulle initiated his "politics of grandeur", asserting that France as a major power should not rely on other countries, such as the United States, for its national security and prosperity.

De Gaulle's vision was grounded in realism. He understood that national interests drive international politics, not sentiment. The transatlantic alliance, he argued, should be a partnership of equals, not a strategic appendage of Washington's whims. Today, the European Union (EU) echoes that sentiment, albeit more cautiously, by reviving calls for strategic autonomy and a European defence force independent of NATO. And its supporters are rightly asking why not? If the US cannot be trusted to preserve Europe's defence or uphold shared global commitments, why does European self-reliance seem an overcorrection?