Defunding the SANDF is a security threat to South Africa

SINCE 1994, South Africa has walked a delicate path, rebuilding its democracy, mending divisions, and re-imagining its place in the world.

- NKOSENHLE MADLALA

In doing so, one of the most profound yet under-discussed shifts have been the demobilisation and defunding of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

While those in power speak of peace, development and regional leadership, the reality is that the institution meant to safeguard the country’s sovereignty and secure its borders has steadily withered.

At first glance, this weakening may appear deliberate, even justified. In the glow of the democratic transition, many believed that South Africa no longer needed a large, expensive military.

The country was not facing imminent invasion, and resources were urgently required for housing, education and health. In that context, reducing the budget for SANDF seemed sensible. But three decades later, the long-term consequences of that choice are coming home to roost.

At the dawn of democracy, the SANDF emerged as a diverse institution, integrating soldiers from the old SADE, Umkhonto we Sizwe, the Azanian People’s Liberation Army, and the former “homeland” forces.

It was a symbol of reconciliation and national unity. Yet, by the early 2000s, its numbers had dropped from around 100 000 to just over 70 000. On paper, this was framed as efficiency and rationalisation. In practice, it meant fewer boots on the ground to guard borders, patrol the seas, or staff peacekeeping missions.

This thinning out coincided with mounting pressures. South Africa's borders grew more porous, with a rising tide of undocumented migration, cross-border smuggling, and human trafficking. International criminal syndicates, arms smugglers and drug cartels took advantage of the gaps. While the police struggled with crime at home, the SANDF meant to be the shield at the borders—was increasingly stretched and under-resourced.