Fire, smoke and soaring worries

The PSLV C-62 fiasco is a stress test of ISRO's technical systems, organisational processes and market credibility

- BY ABHINAV SINGH

Something deeply unsettling unfolded on January 12 at Sriharikota. Minutes after liftoff, the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) C-62 failed, losing payloads from Brazil, Nepal and Spain, and satellites from the Defence Research and Development Authority and several Indian space startups. The incident sent ripples of unease through India's space community.

What made it particularly painful was not just the losses, but the pattern of failure. Just eight months earlier, on May 18, 2025, the PSLV C-61 failed in an almost identical manner. Like in the case of C-62, the breakdown had occurred at precisely the same point: the third stage. The pattern was akin to your most reliable family car breaking down twice within months—each time because of the same mechanical fault.

In its first 62 launches, PSLV suffered only three failures. Now, the two near-identical failures raise an uncomfortable question: why was the May 2025 failure not fully resolved before authorising another launch? Under intense scrutiny is the decision to proceed with the launch, as the C-61 investigation report is pending at the prime minister's office. At the heart of the matter could be a troubling problem: launching without fully learning.

Technically, the C-62 mission began smoothly. But after the first and second stages, telemetry showed a drop in chamber pressure during the third stage—the same problem that had doomed the May 2025 mission. Control was lost, roll rates spiked, and the vehicle drifted off course. Deprived of the thrust needed to achieve orbital velocity, the mission failed.

ISRO chairman V. Narayanan has since announced a failure analysis committee. For the time being, the two identical failures suggest a systemic issue rather than just bad luck.

LOSING COVER