A Union of the Unequals

India's federation endured not because its design guaranteed balance, but because earlier governments exercised restraint

- Anand Teltumbde

ON an otherwise routine day, the Supreme Court delivered a judgement that will reverberate through India's constitutional order. By overturning Justice J.B. Pardiwala's view that Governors and the President cannot sit indefinitely on bills passed by state legislatures, the Court has dealt what may be the final blow to Indian federalism. Governors-unelected Central appointees-are now effectively empowered to paralyse elected state governments simply by doing nothing: no assent, no return, no explanation. What was meant as a limited constitutional check under Articles 200 and 201 has been transformed into an unaccountable veto, allowing Union nominees to nullify the will of millions without action or scrutiny. The Court has effectively told Governors that they may ignore democratic mandates and obstruct governance indefinitely, and the Constitution will shield them. If federalism is truly a basic feature of the Constitution, this ruling amounts to its judicial dismantling-a constitutional death achieved not through amendment, but through interpretation.

To understand this moment, we must confront a truth many are reluctant to acknowledge: the Constitution was built with a clear tilt toward central dominance. This was not oversight-it was deliberate. The framers, scarred by Partition, communal violence, princely resistance, and the fear of Balkanisation, chose a "Union of States", not a federation of equals. The language signalled the intent: an indissoluble structure held together by a powerful Centre.