Plug the oversight gaps

DESIGN OF REGULATOR REFLECTS CAUTION MORE THAN COMMITMENT TO INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

- ANKEETAA MAHESSHWARI & MS SAHOO

THE SUSTAINABLE HARNESSING and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025, brings about two fundamental shifts in our nuclear governance framework.

First, it opens nuclear power generation to multiple participants, transforming state monopoly into a competitive market. Second, it establishes a statutory regulator by conferring legal status on the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which earlier functioned as a government delegate. By pairing market opening with statutory regulation, it aligns nuclear energy with the core architecture of regulated markets.

This piece examines the design of the regulator. While the Act incorporates regulatory best practices, including allowing the AERB to make regulations without prior government approval, it remains cautious and executive-centric. This caution is understandable in a high-risk sector, but need not undermine regulatory effectiveness. For example, a provision for periodic performance evaluation of the regulator would enhance its accountability, without altering the balance of powers.

Composition:

In regulatory design, composition is the first line of defence against capture. On this count, the Act offers limited safeguards. The board comprises a chairperson, a whole-time member, and up to six part-time members (PTMs). The Act mandates no balance. A board dominated by PTMs risks weak continuity, limited engagement, and inadequate institutional memory in a sector that demands sustained, technically informed oversight. Conversely, a board composed almost entirely of WTMs may narrow perspectives and reduce the benefits of external expertise.