Foggy Slope to Armageddon

The first South Asian crisis of the third nuclear age /Conflict

- / ANKIT PANDA

When considering nuclear risks, commentators often invoke “the brink.” The notion evokes a sense of peril. One imagines a precipice, beyond which lies the unthinkable abyss. Rational nuclear powers, in a theoretical sense, understand that the possibility of careening off the brink is precisely what enables deterrence—the word contains the Latin root “terrere,” meaning to frighten or terrify. The prospect of the mass destruction that lies beyond motivates prudence.

However, the proverbial nuclear brink is not a well-defined point beyond which lies ruin. Thomas Schelling, an influential US thinker on nuclear strategy during the Cold War, argued that it was more akin to a “curved slope,” which one might “stand on with some risk of slipping.” This slope is better conceived of as being shrouded in a thick fog. For the protagonists of a nuclear crisis who might see utility in exploring this terrain, the only way to learn the true steepness of the slope is to tread forwards, one step at a time, knowing full well that the next step could lead to a loss of footing and, eventually, towards the abyss. Leaving this terrain uncharted is what nuclear-armed states normally do, even as deep political grievances might fester. Not in South Asia, however.