BEIJING'S BLUEPRINT: PAKISTAN AS THE TEST CASE FOR AFRICA

A new form of strategic subcontracting is taking place, where influence is divided among friendly powers aligned with China’s long-term maritime calculus.

- ASHISH SINGH

China is perfecting a new kind of playbook for the Indian Ocean Region—one that advances its strategic reach without the diplomatic friction that comes with overt basing.

Where a Chinese military footprint provokes alarm, Beijing now relies on trusted intermediaries to secure access under friendlier flags. Nowhere is this quiet recalibration clearer than in the Horn of Africa, where Pakistan's new defence agreement with Somalia mirrors China’s sea-lane priorities while avoiding the optics of a direct PLA presence.

DJIBOUTI TO SRI LANKA: EVOLUTION OF A MODEL

China's 2017 base at Djibouti—the first overseas facility of the People’s Liberation Army—was a turning point in Beijing’s global military posture. Positioned at the gateway to the Red Sea and Suez Canal, it gave China its first permanent logistics hub beyond Asia. The base’s capacity for thousands of troops, a deep-water pier, and helicopter facilities elevated Beijing's ability to project power across the western Indian Ocean.

But Djibouti came at a cost. It deepened suspicions in Washington, New Delhi, and African capitals that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was less about trade than about territory. A similar pattern unfolded in Sri Lanka, where mounting debt led Colombo to hand over Hambantota Port to a Chinese stateowned operator in a 99-year lease. What was marketed as infrastructure cooperation became shorthand for strategic dependency.

The lesson was unmistakable: direct control triggered backlash. Beijing's response has been adaptation, not retreat.

FROM BASES TO PROXIES: THE CONTINUITY OF COERCION