Wasantha Karannagoda’s The Turning Point

The Naval Role in Sri Lanka’s War on LTTE Terrorism - Penguin Books India

- REVIEWED By C. A. CHANDRAPREMA

The role of the Sri Lanka Navy in ending LTTE terrorism often tends to be understated in any discussion of the war.

During the war, pitched battles between the Army and the LTTE were far more frequent and, therefore, tended to get more publicity than confrontations between the Navy and the LTTE out at sea. Yet, from the very earliest days of separatist terrorism in the North, the supply of arms by sea, and escape to Tamil Nadu by boat, were crucial to the terrorists. Later, as the LTTE evolved from hit-and-run terrorism to controlling swathes of territory, escape to India by sea became less important, but the supply of arms and ammunition by sea continued to remain their lifeline.

Throughout the decade of the 1980s, as separatist terrorism developed into a full blown civil war, nobody had given much thought to a comprehensive strategy to defeat the LTTE. However, after the Indian involvement ended in 1990, and Sri Lanka was left to its own devices, the need for such a strategy became evident. In June 1991, the then Army Chief of Staff, Major Gen Cecil Waidyaratne, submitted to the government a document outlining an overall strategy to conclusively defeat the LTTE. One of the recommendations made in Maj Gen. Waidyaratne’s proposal was that the Navy should be expanded more than the Army. His argument was that the terrorists were dependent on arms supplies by sea and the cutting off of such supplies would enable the Army to successfully combat terrorism on land.