How to dissuade Pakistan from stoking terrorism against India

India should employ a multipronged diplomatic and security strategy to get the outcomes it needs

- NITIN PAI

One of the biggest misconceptions about the recently suspended military conflict between India and Pakistan has been around the concept of deterrence. A number of commentators have used it as a frame to assess the objectives and outcomes of the brief but intense bout of warfare between the two countries. Some have argued that the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir marked a failure of deterrence. Others claim that Operation Sindoor restored that deterrence. Yet others claim that Sindoor itself is a failure because it will not prevent Pakistan from instigating terrorist attacks in the future. Much of the confusion comes from the lazy—and inappropriate—use of the term 'deterrence' in the context of terrorism and its punishment.

Deterrence is a situation in which an adversary is persuaded not to take a particular action by holding out a threat of punishment. In the context of India and Pakistan, we can say that there is mutual nuclear deterrence because each side knows that it would suffer unacceptably severe damage.

So, neither side will use nuclear weapons unless its red lines are crossed. These deliberately set the bar very high: India will not use nuclear weapons unless it is first attacked with them; Pakistan will use them only if its existence is threatened.