Unprogrammed appropriations and the quiet erosion of budget discipline

In public finance, control of the budget is control of policy.

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This is why the Constitution vests the power of appropriation exclusively in Congress. It is not a procedural technicality but the Legislature's primary check on executive power and the foundation of fiscal accountability in a presidential system.

Yet this constitutional design is increasingly strained by the growing reliance on Unprogrammed Appropriations (UA) in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). In 2016, UA only had an allocation of P67.5 billion. In 2023, this ballooned to P807.2 billion, then to P724.4 billion and P363.2 billion in 2024 and 2025, respectively. Often defended as a tool for flexibility, UA in fact raises deeper concerns about budget discipline, institutional balance, and fiscal credibility.

The earliest time of a recorded debate on the UA was in the enactment of the 1989 General Appropriations Act (GAA). The proponents early on justified the UA as a tool for management — for efficiency and convenience: you do not have to go back to Congress every time you have extra or new money to spend on programs that the prior year's and current budget could not fund. The Executive itself could just be authorized by the GAA to identify the specific public purpose and allocate the needed funding.

The unprecedented abuse of the UA the past three years is an eloquent example of the dire consequences of weakening the safeguards and creating opportunities for personal financial and political gain.