Painful rice-pledging memories

The Supreme Administrative Court ruling ordering former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra to compensate the state for damages caused by her government's rice-pledging scheme between 2011 and 2014 — amounting to tens of billions of baht — has reawakened painful memories for me as I worked as a commissioner at the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) more than a decade ago.

- MEDHI KRONGKAEW

The pain stems from my having to investigate Yingluck’s case. We had become acquainted as classmates in a training programme at the Capital Market Academy. When the NACC ruled that there was sufficient evidence to indict her, I had already retired from the NACC. Somehow, I couldn't help feeling distressed knowing that Yingluck would inevitably face severe consequences, which she subsequently did.

When I began working at the NACC in late 2006, I observed that many government rice subsidy efforts were plagued by corruption related to rice quality inspections, storage, and distribution, among others. Similar issues existed with other crop subsidy policies with cassava, rubber and maize. As an economist, I launched research funded by the NACC, hiring academics from universities nationwide to study price subsidies for various crops, including rice.

The conclusion was crystal clear: the most effective agricultural subsidy policy required the setting of a fair median price for farmers as a benchmark for the government to provide compensation when farmers had to sell rice when market prices fell below the predetermined threshold. This approach was resonant with economic principles — avoiding market distortions, minimising costs, and reducing opportunities for corruption. The NACC proposed this policy to Samak Sundaravej's government, but received the cold shoulder in return. However, the policy recommendation was well received by the Abhisit government. This government gave this policy a name, the “price guarantee scheme”, implemented without many operational adjustments.