How India Should Deal With The Taliban

The return of the radical Islamists plunges Afghanistan into uncertainty. India must engage rather than boycott the new Taliban regime

- Raj Chengappa

Afghanistan was always a graveyard for empires and now of reputations. The USA has learnt it the hard way. As has India. Till a couple of years ago, we sat at the head table of nations deciding the future of this turmoil-ridden country. However, a fortnight ago, Delhi was forced to wind up its embassy overnight, with ambassador Rudrendra Tandon and his colleagues using the stealth of night to exit the capital Kabul. The following two weeks continued to be harrowing, as the ministry of external affairs pulled all diplomatic strings to evacuate both Indians and Afghans of Indian origin to safety.

Of course, it was not just India that was caught flat-footed by the speed with which the Ashraf Ghani-headed Afghan government capitulated to the Taliban. The mighty US and a host of western countries who had been negotiating for a more orderly transition of power too were scrambling to get their personnel out. “Everyone was expecting a four-wicket win by the Taliban,” says a senior Indian official. “Who thought they would win by an innings and many days to spare?”

The only one smiling, apart from the Taliban, was Pakistan, a country that has bankrolled and masterminded its return. Pakistan prime minister Imran Khan declared that “the shackles of slavery” had been broken. He may have sounded like it was he who led the charge, but it was the Pakistan army—the power behind the throne—that had engineered the comeback. As a diplomat, twisting an old Prussian quote, wryly put it, “Most countries have an army. But the Pakistan army now has not one but two countries.” If we are not careful, he added, “we may end up with two Terroristans!”

THE GEOPOLITICAL IMPACT