GREENLAND AND THE RISE OF ECONOMIC COERCION

When Donald Trump announced that beginning February 1, 2026, eight of America's closest allies would face a blanket 10% tariff on all goods entering the United States, the shock was not merely economic.

- MA HOSSAIN

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Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland—this is not a rogues’ gallery of adversaries. These are NATO partners, treaty allies, and, until recently, presumed beneficiaries of a special status in Washington’s strategic imagination.

The justification was stranger still. The United States, Trump argued, had “subsidized” these countries for centuries by refraining from tariffs. World peace, he warned, was now at stake. The bill had come due.

At one level, this fits neatly into Trump's longstanding worldview: tariffs as leverage, pressure as policy, transaction as diplomacy. But focusing only on trade misses the deeper significance. What is unfolding here is not simply another chapter in a trade war. It is a test case for a far more expansive idea—that economic coercion, national security, and even territorial ambition can be folded into a single, elastic justification for executive power.

The immediate trigger, according to Trump, is Greenland. Without presenting evidence, he has argued that China and Russia covet the island, that Denmark is incapable of defending it, and that only the United States can guarantee its security. The tariff threat—explicitly tied to forcing an agreement over Greenland, and slated to rise to 25% by June—functions less like a trade measure than a sanction. It is designed to compel a change in state behavior.

In substance, this is not new. Great powers have long used economic pressure to achieve political ends. Britain's naval blockades, America’s Cold War sanctions regimes, even the oil embargos of the 1970s all testify to the same logic. Tariffs, in this sense, are simply sanctions with a different name.