Not a G2 reboot, but possibly a G2 overlay

For India, a US-China détente carries significant implications. New Delhi must sharpen diplomatic signalling and make it clear to partners and rivals alike that it values open regional architectures, not spheres carved by others

- Ashok K. Kantha

US President Donald Trump's post on Truth Social ahead of his October 30 meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea - "THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!"- revived chatter of a US-China duet to manage global affairs. The theatre was unmistakably Trumpian, but the substance that followed was tactical and reversible: Modest tariff adjustments, reversal of escalated export controls, resumed Chinese purchases of US agricultural products, suspension of some planned actions for one year, reopened military hotlines, narrowly scoped regulatory dialogues, and reciprocal visits in 2026. These measures were useful deescalation, but they did not constitute the architecture of a duopoly or co-governance. Yet the perception of a "G2 overlay" may carry significant implications for India.

The shorthand "G2" denotes a Group of Two, in which the US and China act as joint stewards of global governance. The label was floated most prominently in 2009 by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Fred Bergsten as a prescription for crisis management during the global financial crisis. Over time, the shorthand expanded to imagine two powers setting rules, managing crises, and, in troubling versions, dividing spheres of influence. It has remained an inchoate idea. Trump's rhetorical flourish does not change that fact. For all its buzz, a durable G2 remains elusive. Any initiative to take G2 beyond rhetoric into co-governance or spheres of influence runs into four obstinate realities.

First, the difference between symbolism and substance. Busan was a theatre with tactical deescalation, not institutionalised co-rule. Understandings reached are de-risking band-aids, easily ripped off when politics shift.