Borderline Issue

A welcome addition to the debate on India’s options in dealing with Pakistan and cross-border terror.

- Srinath Raghavan

Ahead of the 2014 general elections, Narendra Modi successfully projected the image of a tough leader who would transform the terms on which India dealt with terrorism ema­nating from Pakistan. During his initial months in off­ice, Prime Minister Modi seemed to make good on this promise. Since then, however, the Indian government has struggled to evolve a coherent and consis­tent policy towards Pakistan. Faced with terrorist attacks, New Delhi has resorted to the old playbook of calling off talks and urging Pakistan to bring the perpetrators to justice.

To be sure, the government hasn’t had to deal with a major att­ack on the scale of 26/11. In consequence, the question of how the Modi government will respond to a major terror attack remains open. In particular, the old debates on whether, and how, India can use force to co­erce Pakistan remain unsettled.

George Perkovich and Toby Dalton’s book is an excellent contribution to these debates. India, they argue, will inevitably have to do more than strengthen its homeland security. Coercion or the use of force to move Pakistan’s behaviour in the desired direction remains an indispensable option. Following Tom Schelling, they consider coercion both as deterrence—the threat of force to prevent an adversary from doing something—and compellence, or the threat of force to get an adversary to do some thing. Compellence is clearly more difficult than deterrence. This is especially tough when the adversary is not a unitary actor but a combination of state and its client terrorist groups. Put simply, the question is whether India can use the threat of force to convince Pakistan to clamp down on the terrorist outfits that it has patronised for so long.