Improving Anti-Tank Missiles

Anti-tank guided missiles have been in widespread use since the 1960s and have undergone multiple modifications to improve their range and hit probability. However, the most recent developments in guidance systems have the possibility of vastly improving the hit probability of the missile with consequent implication for the survivability of armour on the battlefield, writes SANJAY BADRI-MAHARAJ

- Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

At the outset, the argument that Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) could replace the tank or substitute for the same is a nonsensical one. ATGMs are primarily defensive weapons and while they can be aggressively deployed – as done by the Egyptians during the 1973 war and by Syrian Special Forces during operations against the Israelis in 1982, their defensive nature remains. Furthermore, despite specialised platforms, air, vehicle and ground launched modes, ATGMs remain less mobile and flexible than tanks as weapon systems. The two must perforce be seen as complimentary to each other rather than being mutually exclusive or in some way one being preferable to the other.

First Generation ATGMs 

The first generation of widely deployed ATGMs used what is known as manual control to line of sight (MACLOS) and had a typical range of 1.5-3 km suffered from the following disadvantages: 

(a) The difficulties faced by the operator in simultaneously tracking the target as well as the missile and then transferring commands through the guidance wires through a joystick. The kill probability of the missile system depended on the operator's skill and training and his capability to perform in an actual battlefield scenario.

(b) The speed of the missile was limited to a modest 100-180 m/s owing to the guidance wire being dispensed from the missile and the operator's response time for guiding the missile limited the missile speed to 100-180 m/s.

(c) The slow speed led to the target being able to take remedial action against such a missile with a consequent reduction in kill probability. Furthermore, a long flight time to target made the operator vulnerable from retaliatory fire.