How CID bypassed Navy Act to pull former Commander into Civilian Court

THE Defence Ministry's statement on the arrest of former Navy Commander Admiral Nishantha Ulugetenne reduces a serious constitutional and security matter to a public relations slogan "The law applies equally to all." That is not a legal conclusion, in the military context equality before the law does not erase jurisdictional boundaries.

- By Jehan Hameed

Military law exists not to place service members above accountability but to ensure that offences committed in service or in connection with service are tried within the statutory framework designed to protect both national security and operational integrity.

At the heart of this case is a decisive legal question Did the alleged offence occur during service and in connection with operational duties? If yes, the Navy Act No. 34 of 1950 Sections 34 and 131 applies without question and the proper forum is a court martial If no civilian courts retain jurisdiction. This is not a matter of preference it is the law

The decisive factor here is not public opinion media noise or even the Defence Ministry's soundbite. It is the B Report submitted by the CID to the Magistrate's Court. That document determines how jurisdiction is framed in law. By classifying the alleged offence as a personal matter unrelated to naval service the CID effectively removed the Navy Act from the process and moved the case into civilian jurisdiction.

If the CID's classification is wrong bypassing military law would be a procedural breach with serious implications for state security. If it is right the Navy stands correctly excluded. But that determination cannot be left solely to the CID, a civilian investigative body operating under the Inspector General of Police most likely advised by a Defence Ministry legal division that itself appears to be civilian in composition. Neither the CID nor the IGP has statutory power to overrule or nullify military jurisdiction created by an Act of Parliament.