Beijing's blueprint: Pakistan as the test case for Africa

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was less about trade than about territory.

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A similar pattern unfolded in Sri Lanka, where mounting debt led Colombo to hand over Hambantota Port to a Chinese stateowned operator ina 99-year lease. What was marketed as infrastructure cooperation became shorthand for strategic dependency.

The lesson was unmistakable: direct control triggered backlash. Beijing's response has been adaptation, not retreat.

Rather than repeat the Djibouti and Hambantota models, China now seeks the same outcomes—access, i fluence, and sea-lanesecui ty—through intermediaries that already orbit within its strategic ecosystem. These partners, bonded through defence cooperation, tech nology transfers, and diplomatic alignment, help advance Chinese objectives while maintaining plausible deniability.

Pakistan is the most important of these proxies. It sits at the core of Beijing’s flagship BRI project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which links western China to the Arabian Sea through Gwadar, Over the past decade, China has equipped the Pakistan Navy with some of itsmost advanced warships, including four Type 054A/P multi-role frigates, and is building eight Hangorclass submarines based on Chinese designs. The stated purpose is to enhance Pakistan’s capacity to protect sea lines of communication. The unspoken benefit is Beijing’s extended reach—through a loyal fleet flying a different flag.