Time for a SAARC summit

SINCE the announcement of the ceasefire on May 10, Pakistan has more than once reiterated its willingness to engage in dialogue with India. However, New Delhi has yet to respond in kind, reinforcing the perception that it remains averse to meaningful engagement. In response to US President Donald Trump’s offer to mediate on the Kashmir issue, India firmly rejected third-party involvement. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar maintained that all matters between India and Pakistan would be addressed bilaterally, a position that leaves little room for external facilitation.

- BY MUHAMMAD AMIR RANA

India’s growing economic stature has undoubtedly enhanced its international profile. Yet, its recent confrontations with Pakistan, alongside developments in its immediate neighbourhood, have served as a sobering counterpoint to the prevailing ultranationalist mindset within the country. Just a year earlier, India experienced a diplomatic setback when a friendly government in Bangladesh was overthrown amid a violent uprising. These back-to-back challenges have exposed vulnerabilities in India’s regional policy and raised questions about the current leadership's capacity to manage complex relationships with its neighbours.

The inability to cultivate stable ties within the region undermines India’s diplomatic standing and tempers the expectations of those in the West who view New Delhi as a strategic counterweight to Beijing. For many observers, these developments offer a more grounded assessment of India’s regional influence and the limits of its current foreign policy trajectory.

Pakistan has never denied engaging in dialogue with India, both directly and through backchannel mechanisms. At present, communication at the level of the directors general of military operations continues as part of efforts to uphold the ceasefire agreement. Yet, the prevailing mood in New Delhi remains unyielding, with little indication of interest in reviving either a comprehensive or composite dialogue process. This reluctance is largely shaped by the political cost of any engagement that places Kashmir on the agenda, a prospect the current Indian government appears keen to avoid, especially following its unilateral revocation of Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir’s special status on Aug 5, 2019.