Delhi’s multilateralism plank needs tweaking

Differences between India and China are now at the heart of their interactions in multilateral institutions and, thus, of geopolitics

- Devendra Kumar Jabin T Jacob

On June 26, the defence ministers’ meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) concluded in the eastern Chinese coastal city of Qingdao without a joint statement.

India had refused to sign on as the draft document avoided mention of the Pahalgam terrorist attack in April while highlighting terrorist incidents in Pakistan. India argued that signing the document ‘would undermine its positions and policies on State-sponsored terrorism.

This bias highlighted by defence minister Rajnath Singh underscores China’s efforts to shield its “iron brother” and ally, Pakistan. While the disagreement over the issue casts a shadow over high-level meetings of SCO hosted by China as the rotating president, it also reflects a deeper problem of how India-China differences are now at the heart of their interactions in multilateral institutions and, thus, of geopolitics.

SCO and Brics, which is set to have its summit over the weekend in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, have been geopolitically significant from their very conception. However, their focus was on what Chinese official statements often identify as “practical cooperation,” which included cooperation in economics and trade, technology, counter-terrorism, and sharing experiences in dealing with governance challenges to coordinating positions in multilateral trade negotiations at the World Trade Organisation and International Monetary Fund and on climate change. This focus allowed the members to avoid geopolitical divisions. While these are still significant objectives, China's strategies in these organisations have changed in the last decade.