A Fatal Sticking Point

In the days and hours before October 7, intelligence that should have made its way up the IDF chain of command didn't reach people who could have connected the dots

- by YAAKOV KATZ and AMIR BOHBOT

When Hamas invaded Israel on the morning of October 7, 2023, the country was unprepared for the onslaught. Before the Israeli military could regain control, Hamas fighters had killed around 1,200 people and took about 250 more hostage—approximately 50 of whom are still being held, 20 of which are still thought to be alive in captivity almost two years later. For a country on constant alert to threats from its neighbors on all sides, how was Israel's military caught by surprise? That's the question former editor-in-chief of THE JERUSALEM POST Yaakov Katz and military and defense journalist Amir Bohbot interrogate in their new book, WHILE ISRAEL SLEPT: HOW HAMAS SURPRISED THE MOST POWERFUL MILITARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Their book offers an analysis of the massive failure, with the goal of highlighting lessons that should be learned going forward. In this exclusive excerpt, Bohbot and Katz revisit the night before the attack, examining how Israeli intelligence could have prevented the invasion.

ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 6, 2023, while most IDF commanders were preparing for the Sukkot holiday weekend, IDF chief Herzi Halevi convened a group of senior officers on the military's secure phone line to review what was expected that weekend.

A former head of the Southern Command and Aman, the IDF's intelligence body, Halevi was an officer of the big army but also of the special forces, well versed in the difference between the two and how to get the best out of a large force or just a few good men. He also knew the importance of having intelligence agencies work together. As head of Aman from 2014 to 2018, he oversaw the signing of a memorandum of understanding between that agency and Shin Bet that clarified responsibility over different areas as well as the allocation of resources.