How Will S-E Asia Fill the China Gap as Development Funds Dry Up?

Beijing's aid disbursements are shrinking in a region recalibrating its dependence.

- Alexandre Dayant and Grace Stanhope

As the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) enters its second decade, the story of China's development finance in South-east Asia is shifting, marked not by growing dominance, but by recalibration, caution and quiet resistance.

Once seen as the region's development giant, Beijing has seen its footprint in South-east Asia shrink. Chinese aid disbursements in the region have fallen from a high of US$9 billion in 2015 to US$4 billion (S$5.2 billion) in 2023. New commitments are drying up, and China has slipped from the top donor to third place, behind the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and just ahead of Japan.

What happened? Partly, China is pulling back, tightening its belt amid slowing growth and rising domestic needs. But perhaps more importantly, South-east Asia is pushing back.

For example, several high-profile Chinese infrastructure projects in the region have faced backlash or renegotiation amid growing political and financial concerns. In Malaysia, the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) has been suspended, restructured, and partially revived under successive governments, while two other projects—the Multi-Product Pipeline and the Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline—were cancelled or left in limbo due to corruption allegations and poor implementation.

Similarly, Thailand's high-speed railway project is now being self-financed, after concerns over Chinese loan terms.