AMIT SHAH’S HARD LINE, CLEAR DEADLINES — AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE MAOIST WAR

The killing of Madvi Hidma — the most feared, brutal and operationally effective Maoist commander in Bastar — is not merely another successful encounter. It marks the culmination of a six-year counterinsurgency doctrine personally driven by Union Home Minister Amit Shah, one that combined political clarity, operational aggression and unprecedented state-state coordination.

- ABHINANDAN MISHRA

Union Home Minister Amit Shah. File photo

From the moment Shah took charge of the Home Ministry in June 2019, he made it publicly, repeatedly and forcefully clear that Naxalism would be eliminated. Not reduced. Not contained. Eliminated. He said this in Parliament and in multiple public programmes with a conviction intended not only for citizens but also for Maoist leadership and their sympathisers. The message was unmistakable: the MHA under him was not in the mood for compromise.

This clarity extended to the question of surrender. When some civil society voices suggested incentivising mass surrenders as a confidence-building measure, Shah’s response was unequivocal: they must first lay down arms. Only then would the government consider the terms of surrender. This sequencing — disarm first, negotiate later — set the tone for the policy framework that followed.

Inside the system, the political intent translated into direct instructions to police leadership across all affected states. Senior officers posted in the Naxal belt recall that the Home Ministry's message in those early months was unusually blunt: If you face operational or logistical challenges, tell us. We will remove them. But the mission is fixed: eliminate Naxalism.

To ensure this did not remain rhetoric, Shah instituted regular review meetings, many of which he personally supervised. Officers who attended these meetings say one thing stood out: Shah demanded factual, verifiable progress every single time. No vague updates, no bureaucratic jargon, no speculative projections. Every review began with a simple, unavoidable question: What has actually changed on the ground since the last meeting?

This changed behaviour across the board. Officers stopped preparing cosmetic presentations; they started preparing operations. The next meeting couldn't be answered with words — it had to be answered with results.