AMERICAN LESSONS ON MILITARY JOINTNESS

Those talking of jointness need to understand that it is a process requiring planning, visionary leadership, and considerable period of time to implement

- AMIT GUPTA

In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, the call for bringing about jointness has gained new momentum in Indian defence circles. Not only has there been a call for establishing theatre commands in a timely manner, but we are also witnessing an internecine feud between the Navy and the Air Force, where the future modernisation plans of the IAF have been categorised as costly and unnecessary.

Background

The United States military did not come up with the idea of jointness or show much enthusiasm for it. The push came from the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, where the United States Congress mandated that the military move towards jointness. The Congress's dissatisfaction stemmed from the military failures of the Vietnam War and the fiasco of the aborted attempt to rescue hostages from Iran.

It became apparent to politicians that the military was not functioning as an effective fighting force since it operated not as a whole but as a disjointed entity.

The political guidance came to bring about a greater cohesion in the efforts of the services so that they could fight more effectively. Further, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was made the principal military advisor to the President, and the commanders of US combatant commands like CENTCOM were given full control over the forces in their region rather than being at the mercy of the service chiefs and begging for troops for a particular mission.

Barely five years after Goldwater-Nichols, the United States fought the first Gulf War and then engaged in an air war in Bosnia. The Gulf War was the first test of jointness, which was then in its infancy, but the American forces did not need much effort to prevail over the Iraqis, who had incompetent leadership and were weak foes.