Ukraine war is giving a strategic boost to North and South Korea

Both Pyongyang and Seoul have gained more than just profits from arms sales.

- Jonathan Eyal

During the long decades of the Cold War, North and South Korea regularly found themselves on opposing sides in every international conflict. South Korean ground forces fought together with South Vietnam's troops, while North Korean pilots fought with Hanoi's armed forces. More recently, while the North Koreans sold weapons or military technology to Syria, Iran and any other anti-Western government or militia in the Middle East, South Korea contributed to US-led coalition forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is therefore not surprising that something similar is happening now, with the war in Ukraine: the North Koreans are supplying ammunition to Russia, while the South Koreans are increasingly becoming a key weapon supplier for Western nations helping Ukraine's fight against the Russian invasion.

But unlike previous conflicts, the war in Ukraine is not merely pulling the Pyongyang and Seoul governments in different directions; it is also altering the security situation in the Korean peninsula.

Neither North nor South Korea either expected or wanted to be actively involved in the Ukraine war. Pyongyang and Seoul were quick to realise the high strategic stakes. And, clearly, they expected "their" side to win the confrontation: the North rooted for a Russian win, while the South hoped for a victory of the US-led camp in the Ukraine conflict.

Neither side initially expected to be asked to provide direct help to the protagonists in the fighting for perfectly good reasons. The war was expected to be brief; China - by far the most significant strategic swing player on the Korean peninsula seemed determined to maintain its neutrality, and neither the United States nor its European allies had any intention of sending their soldiers to fight in Ukraine.