Britain's Potemkin defence – and why it's not fit for the modern battlefield

The UK military is woefully short of the weapons needed to make its ships, tanks and jets a lethal force

- Bernard Gray

For much of the 1830s, Lord Palmerston stood behind a tall desk in the Foreign Office, staring down into Whitehall as he fired off dispatches to all corners of the empire, day and night. To make sure neither friend nor foe thought his polite messages were requests, he made sure that the Royal Navy was on hand to back up his words with ammunition.

Gunboat diplomacy was born and the presence of the navy has been integral to British power projection ever since. The capacity for violence was key to power and influence in international affairs. Scroll forward two centuries and it is the same realpolitik today.

With this difference: unlike two centuries ago, when navy decks were stacked with cannonballs to bolster the talking, today the Royal Navy, and the rest of the UK's armed forces, are woefully short of weapons to back up London's posturing.

Britain is spending far too little on its platforms the ships, aircraft and tanks that carry its threat of force with them - but what is worse is that even less is being spent on weapons to make them lethal. Silos that should hold the weapons are often thinly loaded or even bare. The Royal Navy all too often lacks the weapons to sink other ships, or strike at targets on land. The Royal Air Force is poorly placed to defend Britain's skies from missile attacks. The army cannot protect the space above its troops' heads, and lacks the artillery or tanks to strike at opposing forces.