Federalism And Its Discontents

- Shashank Kela

THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION IS A CURIOUS DOCUMENT. It begins with some perfunctory, if resonant, phrases about justice, liberty and equality before embarking upon a detailed outline of the institutions of the new state. Much of it is devoted to setting out mechanisms of power and methods of exercising it—the British state provides the template for parliamentary government; the American example is reflected in a federal arrangement, with power shared between the centre and states. There are significant differences: the 13 colonies that made up the United States enjoyed an independent existence long before the nation was born. In India, the nation-state comes first, and retains the power to reshape its units. The Rajya Sabha was created to represent their interests, with seats allocated roughly in proportion to population.

Federalism was to play a fundamental role in shaping the social and economic landscape of independent India. Designed to defuse potential conflicts arising out of the country’s heterogeneity, it rapidly acquired a second function—that of managing the pace and direction of social change in the interests of regional elites. This was a process marked by conflict and compromise: conflicts between upper and middle castes (ending, as such struggles tend to do, in an uneasy alliance), and concessions to plebeian castes and interest groups at different times and places. The purpose was not so much to inhibit change as to deflect it, to make sure the deeper roots of power and privilege remained undisturbed. It is this submerged aspect of federalism that forms the subject of my essay.