PENETRATING MARITIME A2/AD

Increasing the range of air-to-surface missiles has become an important factor in penetrating A2/AD defences, particularly in the maritime environment.

- Jon Lake

In the early years of air power, aircraft had to overfly their targets in order to deliver a meaningful effect, thereby exposing themselves to antiaircraft defences. Even strafing (striking a ground target with gun or cannon fire) usually required the attacking aircraft to fly within the envelope of defensive weapons and systems. More recently, unguided rockets allowed an attacking aircraft to stand off a little further, but with a loss of accuracy and precision such that Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots in the 1980s viewed the unguided rockets such as the Societe Nouvelle des Etablissements Edgar Brandt (SNEB) 2.7 inch (68mm) as an ‘area’ weapon and not as a precise direct fire weapon like a gun.

Guided missiles offer greater standoff range and precision. But because missiles represent a difficult target, it is always preferable to engage the missile launch platform before it has reached its firing point. This has led to the development of longer-range defensive systems which have, in turn, required the production of longer-ranged, faster, lower-flying, and lower signature missiles.

The employment of long-range air-launched missiles in much of the Indo-Pacific region is further complicated by China’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which aim to push enemy missile launch platforms further out from Chinese targets, preventing them from operating close enough to China’s coast to be able to pose a threat.

The anti-access element of China’s A2/AD strategy uses attack aircraft, warships, and submarines, as well as precision-guided ballistic missiles and advanced land-attack cruise missiles to create a heavily contested air and surface environment over a very wide area.