IRAN'S MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON

By exploiting a Saudi-UAE rivalry, Tehran turns Gulf divisions into a quiet strategic advantage—reshaping alliances and regional power without firing a shot

- BY ARASH REISINEZHAD Arash Reisinezhad is visiting assistant professor at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

ON MAY 17, A DRONE STRIKE TARGETED THE United Arab Emirates' sole nuclear power plant. A week earlier, another drone strike caused a major fire at the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone, injuring three Indian nationals. Abu Dhabi immediately accused Tehran of orchestrating both incidents. Beyond drones and missiles, Iran is apparently pursuing a quieter strategy based on weaponizing an existing Riyadh-Abu Dhabi rift.

The Saudi-Emirati split did not begin with the current war. For more than a decade, beneath the surface of what appeared to be a cohesive alliance, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been competing—quietly, then openly—for regional primacy across several fronts of foreign investment, energy policy and regional influence.

At the center of this divergence lies an intensifying competition for regional leadership. The UAE consolidated its position early as a global hub for trade, finance and logistics, with Dubai emerging as the Middle East's commercial gateway. Saudi Arabia, through Vision 2030, has since sought to replicate and surpass that model by attracting multinational headquarters and investing heavily in parallel infrastructure.

This rivalry has also intensified across multiple regional theaters. In Yemen, while both initially cooperated within the anti-Houthi coalition, Abu Dhabi shifted toward backing southern local actors, whereas Saudi Arabia emphasized preserving Yemeni territorial unity under a central authority.

In Sudan, Abu Dhabi has been more closely associated with the Rapid Support Forces, while Riyadh has positioned itself as a mediator seeking state stability. Similar divergences appear in the Horn of Africa, where the UAE has focused on port infrastructure and sub-state partners, while Saudi Arabia has leaned toward supporting central governments.