Dethroned by default

Democracies that share our parliamentary heritage have resisted the temptation to fuse criminal process with constitutional legitimacy, says Satyadeep Kumar Singh.

- Satyadeep Kumar Singh

In Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar", it is not the tyrant's sword but the daggers of fear, envy, and intrigue that bring down the ruler. The conspirators do not wait for lawful judgment or the Senate's procedure; they strike because suspicion is enough. With the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, introduced in the Lok Sabha, India risks scripting its own republican tragedy, where the dagger of arrest- still sheathed in presumption of innocence - is made sufficient to depose those who carry the popular mandate.

The Bill seeks to effectuate significant changes in the constitutional framework governing the tenure of the executive. It proposes amendments to Articles 75, 164, and 239AA of the Constitution, thereby altering the conditions under which the Prime Minister, a Chief Minister, or any other Minister may continue in office.

Under the proposed scheme, if the Prime Minister, Chief Minister, or a Minister is arrested and remains in detention for a continuous period of thirty days or more in connection with an alleged offence that carries a statutory punishment of imprisonment extending to five years or beyond, such a person would be under a constitutional compulsion to resign. In the event resignation is not tendered, the office is to be deemed vacated by operation of law.

The Bill further stipulates that such individuals may be considered for reappointment only upon their release from custody. A parallel provision has also been inserted in relation to the National Capital Territory of Delhi under Article 239AA, thereby extending this arrest-and-detention based disqualification to its elected executive as well.