HOW INTEL ‘GAPS’ OCCUR

In the wake of the massacre in Baisaran (Pahalgam), some reports claimed that it was an “intelligence” or “security” failure.

- Vappala Balachandran

As of now it is not clear why the Baisaran meadows, a popular picnic spot of tourists, which is 50 km from the Amarnath shrine, was left unguarded by any security group in the state working under the “Unified Command.” An unconfirmed report said that the picnic site was not “officially opened” and hence no security was detailed.

The purpose of this column is not to apportion blame for this lapse but to explain how “security threats” are processed by governments in general, and how these “gaps” occur. Since J&K is a sensitive area, intelligence agencies belonging to national civil, military and paramilitary departments have a large presence there, in addition to the state police intelligence department.

Although national intelligence agencies report to their headquarters, they do keep the Lt. Governor and the “Unified Command” under him apprised of any changes in the security scenario so that preventive mechanisms can be suitably altered depending on the local threat perception. However, such intelligence when report: ed to higher echelons like the Lt. Governor (in J&K law and order is still under the Lt. Governor) must be carefully verified as the action following such alerts has national and international ramifications.

Raw intelligence becomes policy for action only after an alchemic process of collection, collation, analysis, dissemination, arbitration, policy adjudication and decision-making. Any inter-space in this process would lead to a situation in which intelligence, including technical pointers already available in some form with any wing of a government, does not result in policy or action. This leads to an impression of “intelligence or security failure.”