America shows no sign of getting rid of its delusions on Pakistan

HARSH V. PANT & VINAY KAURA are, respectively, professor of international relations, King's College London, and assistant professor, international affairs and security studies, Sardar Patel University of Police, Security & Criminal Justice.

- HARSH V. PANT & VINAY KAURA

In the arena of global diplomacy, where visible gestures are often decoys and true intentions remain hidden, last week's overture of US President Donald Trump towards Pakistan's army chief, General Asim Munir, needs to be understood not as a standalone event, but in the context of America's weekend strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities; i.e., as part of a calculated manoeuvre rooted in both expediency and ignorance. That Trump "was honoured" to meet Munir and publicly claimed Pakistanis "knew Iran better than most" was not casual talk. It was a premeditated message that underscored America's need of Pakistan on its side both diplomatically and potentially as a military partner. Courting the Pakistani general, however, is also a misjudgment—a glimpse of America's enduring delusions.

India can easily see through the US-Pakistan theatre. And it need not react with anxiety or noise. Instead, it should observe, evaluate, and, when needed, act with precision.

Trump's decision to engage directly with Pakistan's army chief through lunch diplomacy at the White House is hardly surprising. It is a throwback to the antiquated logic of bipolar era diplomacy where the American state, impatient with the democratic disorder in a military-dominated milieu, finds solace in military men—generals who make lofty promises of order, control and silence.

As a veteran of anti-communist Cold War alliances SEATO and CENTO and a front-line US ally during the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan is well-versed with the nuances of American strategy making. From Dwight D. Eisenhower's fondness of General Ayub Khan to Ronald Reagan's strategic embrace of General Zia-ul-Haq, the American presidency has followed a consistent pattern. However, as history has demonstrated, courting generals may yield a tactical advantage but invite strategic disaster.