India's strategic culture and how it uses force

The deep-seated desire to demonstrate to the world that India is a responsible actor constrains the country's military objectives — where material outcomes matter, not reputation

- Happymon Jacob

Does a tradition of risk aversion continue to define India's strategic culture and its use of force? Does this aversion embolden adversaries to consider the use of force more easily, threaten its use more effectively, and use it more readily? Has our self-professed "peace-loving" identity become a self-fulfilling prophecy, constraining our military doctrines and warfighting impulses?

A quick review of the historical record will demonstrate that, despite being a conventionally weaker power, Pakistan has consistently engaged in war initiation vis-à-vis India. Pakistan initiated the 1947-48 war, seizing a large part of Jammu and Kashmir. It also initiated the 1965 war. In 1971, Pakistan attacked Indian airfields, technically initiating the war. And in 1999, India was merely responding to Pakistan's infiltration into the Kargil sector in large numbers. In each case, Pakistan initiated the conflict, and India responded.

Let me expand the definition of initiation of hostilities to make a larger point. Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism against India also falls within the broad definition of conflict initiation. This includes the 2001 Parliament attack (killing nine people), the 2008 Mumbai massacre (over 160 fatalities), the 2016 Uri attack (19 soldiers killed), the Pulwama attack (40 CRPF personnel dead), and the recent Pahalgam killings (26 civilians). In each of these cases, the Pakistani side initiated the hostilities, if you view the use of sub-conventional force as initiation of hostilities.