Interests over ideology

The response to the West Asia war cannot be guided by old ideological reflexes. Strategic equidistance best protects India's interests

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EVERY MAJOR CONFLICT in West Asia eventually produces the same debate back home: which side should India support? The latest escalation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has revived that familiar argument. Critics in sections of the opposition and parts of the left-leaning academic establishment have suggested that India should tilt more openly towards Iran, partly on the grounds of historical ties and partly as a counterweight to Western influence. Others maintain that our expanding defence and technology partnerships require us to stand more firmly with the US and Israel.

Both arguments reflect a way of thinking that belongs largely to the twentieth century. Much of the intellectual framework shaping this debate comes from an era when global politics was organised around rigid ideological camps. In that world, countries were expected to belong clearly to one bloc or another. But the strategic environment in which we operate today is far more fluid. In a system defined by overlapping interests rather than ideological camps, rigid positioning rarely serves national interest.

The current war illustrates precisely why. India is not a direct participant in the conflict and is unlikely to become one. Its interests in the region are primarily economic, energy-related, and geopolitical. Millions of Indian citizens live and work across West Asia. A large share of India's energy imports continues to flow from the region. Maritime routes through the Arabian Sea and the Gulf remain critical to trade. For New Delhi, the overriding objective in any regional crisis is therefore stability rather than alignment.