The Everything Bubble

How the Fed redistributed wealth upward and encouraged reckless corporate behavior

- BRIAN DOHERTY

IN 2010 THOMAS Hoenig, then the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and a member of the central bank's Federal Open Market Committee, thought he was seeing history repeat itself.

In the early 1980s, when he was a vice president at the Kansas City Fed overseeing bank examiners, he had a front-row seat to a boom and bust in land and oil asset values, which gutted the Midwest's economy. That painful experience stemmed largely from the Fed's loose money policy in the 1970s, followed by that policy's sudden reversal. Hundreds of banks had loans that depended on soaring asset prices, and hundreds of banks failed. Hoenig was responsible for helping decide which banks would live and which would die. He saw "lives were destroyed in this environment" and "people lost everything." Remembering that experience a few decades later, Hoenig did something the collegial structure of the Federal Open Market Committee was designed to discourage: He dissented.

He began voting against the Fed's ongoing policy of quantitative easing (Q.E.)-that is, the injection of new money into the financial system by purchasing bonds from well-connected "primary dealers" on Wall Street-because he foresaw another ultimately unsupportable rise in asset values along with increasingly risky behavior by privileged market players awash in easy money.

In The Lords of Easy Money, business reporter Christopher Leonard relies on Hoenig's heretical perspective as a narrative spine for his detailed reporting on the Fed's thought and action before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis.