FALL OF THE SPARTANS

The powerful Greek city-state overreached itself and saw its influence decline as it failed to integrate conquered territories

- WORDS ANDREW BAYLISS

The opening sentence of the fourth-century BCE Athenian historian and philosopher Xenophon’s description of the Spartan constitution says it all. When explaining that Sparta had become the most powerful state in Greece, as a result of the laws imposed by the mythical Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus, Xenophon observes that Sparta was able to attain such fame and power despite being “among the scantest populated” city-states in Greece. He was well aware that Sparta’s greatest strength was having between 6,000 and 9,000 wealthy citizens, all of whom bought into the system. But he also knew that the small size of this Spartan in-group was Sparta’s great weakness - such a small number of fighting men could only take them so far.

After conquering and enslaving their neighbours in Messenia in the seventh century BCE, the Spartans did their best to compensate for their lack of numbers by making alliances with neighbouring states in the region of southern Greece known as the Peloponnese. Each of these allied states was led by oligarchs who owed their position and security to Sparta. On their own, none of these could hope to defeat the Spartans, who offered protection against the other big power in the Peloponnese, the city-state of Argos. After they had suffered a crushing defeat at Sepeia in the early fifth century BCE, even the Argives had to accept that Sparta was the power in the Peloponnese. The backing of Peloponnesian allies allowed the Spartans to grow their power and gain influence over the other mainland Greeks, and eventually - albeit briefly - the Greeks of the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor.