Countering China In Nepal And The Neighbourhood

On May 15, India’s army chief suggested what many were afraid to say—bringing up the border dispute in the Kalapani region with India, he noted that Nepal “might have raised the issues at the behest of someone else”, obviously referring to China. This was swiftly followed by a flurry of paranoid China analysis. On television, talking heads bellowed about a Chinese “puppet government” in Kathmandu, even asking India to use its “assets” to topple it.

We don’t know what hard intelligence General M.M. Naravane and the government may have to prove that Beijing really instigated Nepal against India. But we do know that China has been giving India a tough time in Nepal and across the neighbourhood.

From infrastructure investments to political influence and military exercises, Beijing’s expanding presence in the region is slowly but surely eroding India’s traditional influence in Kathmandu, Dhaka, and Colombo. No longer the predominantly South Asian power, India has been forced into a strategic rethink. Blaming China may be an easy and quick way out, but it will not solve the problem.

Indeed, the dispute with Nepal over the recent weeks shows that India will have to up its game and make tough choices on multiple fronts to remain an influential regional power. The crisis shows that India’s past proclivity to micromanage Nepal’s internal politics is useless and even counterproductive. Delhi was in for a rude shock when Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s constitutional amendment was approved unanimously, including by the Nepal Congress, as well as by the Madhesi and other opposition parties that are traditionally more sensitive to India’s concerns than the Communists.

Different political parties in Nepal will continue to play off each other, all professing to be India’s best friends while in opposition. But as soon as they get power, they will naturally turn around to play the balancing game with China or spur anti-India sentiments to consolidate their support. The same happens in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, where India can no longer afford to have permanent friends, but only permanent interests.