Psychological Defence, a pillar under our Total Defence concept, is crucial to the SAF, MINDEF and Singapore. Applied to the nation, it refers to our citizens’ confidence and commitment to Singapore, and their readiness to protect what is ours. Applied to MINDEF and the SAF, it is about strengthening our soldiers’ motivation, cohesiveness, confidence and mental resilience in defending Singapore.

In this essay, the author highlights that the development and deployment of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) in modern warfare raises pressing ethical questions. He examines the ethical problems posed by the use of AWS and critically assesses the arguments presented by various writers. The author evaluates the ethical frameworks presented in the readings and explores the implications of deploying AWS in the context of the laws of armed conflict and just war theory. He compares and contrasts various positions on the topic, including the arguments for and against the deployment of AWS, the possibility of accountability and responsibility for AWS, and the ethical implications of using AWS for targeted killings. The author argues that ultimately, while there may be some advantages to using AWS in warfare, the ethical concerns raised by their deployment are significant and must be addressed. He concludes by advocating for a cautious and principled approach to the development and deployment of AWS, one that prioritises ethical considerations and human well-being.


In this essay, the author argues that the Centre of Gravity (COG)  concept is not too abstract a concept to be of use to military planners. He begins by defining the physical and moral centres of gravity and then proceeds to examine possible confusions in defining and applying COG which may arise from factors such as the operating environment, inherent unpredictability in war and so on. However, the author goes on to explain how the concept is nevertheless useful in aiding understanding. Finally, the author looks at modernised approaches to defining the COG and uses the case study of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Marawi to examine this thinking in the context of counter insurgency operations.


In this essay, the author theorises that a state’s growth in economic might is o..en matched by an increasingly outward
-facing strategic vision and a corresponding build-up of military power projec..on capabili..es. He cited the example of the
United States, a growing economic power by the late 19th century, who managed to overcome its isola..onist foreign policy and
rise to its global role. The author then explores the rela..onship between wealth and power, highligh..ng that as na..ons become
increasingly wealthy, they extend themselves globally as well as equip themselves with military tools to influence areas far
beyond their borders. The author proceeds with a defini..on of military power projec..on. He then analyses the examples of
China, India and Japan and shows how the acquisi..on of such capabili..es by each country is inextricably linked to their rising
economic strength and increasingly global strategic vision.

Both World War Two (WWII) and World War One (WWI) mark some of humanity’s darkest moments in the 20th century—cities razed to the ground, acts of unspeakable cruelty and deaths numbering in the untold millions. In this essay, the author argues that, despite the undeniably bloody legacy left by both wars, WWII still stands as the more destructive and intense of the two battles, henceforth referred to as it being closer to ‘Total War’. The author highlight factors like an immeasurable body count, greater aggression across all parties concerned, a more profound impact on industries, the participation of more civilians and the involvement of countries and regions that were previously not involved in WWI, which underscores the devastation left by WWII. The unprecedented impact of WWII, the author feels can, even now, be felt in every continent of the world and, therefore exemplifies the character of ‘Total War’ rather than WWI.

In this essay, the author examines the challenges faced by states seeking to deter threats without the
advantage of possessing nuclear weapons. He first examines the principles behind deterrence such as the two main
strategies of denial and punishment. The factors needed for successful deterrence—capability, credibility and
communication—are also examined. The author then goes on to highlight the differences between conventional and
nuclear deterrence. Singapore is cited as a case study to highlight how elements of diplomacy, information and
economics along with military deterrence can shape a successful strategy. The author concludes by stating that
though a strong military is still the most practical means for non-nuclear states to protect themselves, it must be
utilised along with these other factors due to the limitations of conventional deterrence.

In this essay, the author examines the continuities and developments in naval warfare in three sections. First, he examines the concept of naval warfare. Second, he studies the role of naval thought and technology in the revolution and evolution of naval warfare. In the third and final section, the author analyses the geo-strategic, economic, legal and social factors that drive developments in naval warfare. The author concludes by stating that for most countries particularly maritime nations, navies will continue to serve as critical instruments of power and as an extension of defence and security policies to safeguard their national interest and survival through the peace-war continuum.


In this essay, the author first defines deterrence and explains its concept and its key elements. He then explores the application of conventional deterrence strategies, whether it is through denial, or through punishment, and touch on its limitations. He proceeds to examine the existential nature of nuclear deterrence and the role it plays in shaping deterrence between states. Specifically, the author illustrates why nuclear-equipped states do not necessarily enjoy a deterrence advantage in today’s security environment and discusses the deterrence strategies that non-nuclear states can employ. The author argues that these deterrence strategies remain viable, albeit complemented by other instruments of the state such as defence, diplomatic and economic interdependence. In the essay, the author also focuses on traditional state actors that apply rationality to its risks-benefit analysis in its decision-making processes. The author does not cover deterrence towards non-state actors, whose conduct of violence through terrorism for the objective of fear mongering and attention-seeking, thrives under the cloak of non-statelessness and diverges from traditional concepts of deterrence, which will require a separate study.


States are increasingly vulnerable in the modern-day 21st century geopolitical environment, arising from globalization, connectivity and disruptions from the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR). Economic interdependency and the global free flow of ideas and information have increased the vulnerability of states to economic and political-social disruptions across multiple fronts of inter-state competition and conflicts short of war. In this complex, dynamic and uncertain geopolitical environment of the 21st century, sovereign states engage in geopolitical competition below the threshold level of war within a Grey Zone to preserve their sovereignty and advance their national interests. This is especially so for non-Great Power states—middle powers and small states—which have inherent limitations to its power and influence and do not have the capacities like great powers to coerce and compel others to do their will. The non-Great Power state must employ all available instruments of its national power coherently through grand strategy-making in order to wield soft power and compete effectively in the Grey Zone against coercion to preserve their sovereignty and advance their national interests.

In this essay, the author cites Mary Kaldor1, who argues that armed conﬂicts in the post-Cold War era is fundamentally diﬀerent from traditional Clausewitzian interstate conflicts. Unlike old wars, which were fought between state-controlled militaries for geopolitical and ideological reasons, 'new wars' are predominantly financed by 'predatory private means' and fought in the name of identity. Identity politics has played an important role in legitimising the use of violence against other groups, for geopolitical and ideological pursuits, in both classical and contemporary armed conflicts and it is difficult to split the concept of identity politics from geopolitics due to the nature of warfare as a social activity. The author concludes by explaining that identity politics is being used as a tool to incite violence against out-groups. Identity also shares a strong emotional linkage with concept of a ‘homeland’, and has been politicised by interest groups to further their geopolitical agendas. 

In this essay, the author highlights that while civilian leadership may help to drive top-down military innovation in peacetime, a civil-military relationship characterised by direct civilian control breeds a culture of deference and thus negatively affects a military's spontaneity in adapting to current realities. By examining the changes in civil-military relations in Israel from 1985 to 2006 and its corresponding effects on the Israel Defense Force's adaptation in dealing with Hezbollah, the author aims to illustrate that heightened civilian constraints on the military impinge on the military's ability to strategically and operationally adapt to the character of the Second Lebanon War. The author concludes that civilian and military leaders should seek a balanced and supportive civil-military relationship and foster a conducive culture of initiative and independent thinking to enable better integration of top-down innovation and bottom-up adaptation.

In this essay, the author discusses the various dimensions of strategy. He examines Clausewitz’s five elements of strategy in his seminal work On War. He also explores Colin Gray’s 17 Dimensions and Michael Howard’s Four
Dimensions of Strategy. The author then studies the question that some dimensions may be more fundamental
than others in securing victory. He suggests that all the above dimensions were interactively in play and that no one
or two dimensions can guarantee success although culture, identified as a dimension, can manifest itself in all
dimensions. Finally, the author concludes that we will have to prepare for conflicts with these dimensions of
strategy to improve our future strategic performance.

In this essay, the author feels that threat assessments are the foundation of a state's national security policy. To explain how threat assessments become self-fulfilling prophecies, he has organised the essay into five parts. In the first part, the author highlights the features of threat assessments and the challenges faced. He also explains why intention assessments of threats are more important than assessments of their capabilities and stresses that intention assessments are primarily based on perceptions. He then describes the origins of misperception and how it may contribute to decision-makers' cognitive bias, which influences their subsequent actions. He proceeds to outline the possible factors on how intentions can be misperceived as hostile even though the reality may suggest otherwise. He then suggests how misperceptions can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies and broadly describes how states may act when they perceive threats. Finally, the author concludes with the measures to ensure that threat assessments do not become self-fulfilling prophecies.

The author highlights that many contemporary military strategists and practioners value the philosophies
contained in Carl Von Clausewitz’s classic On War and its relevance to present day conflict. On the other hand, there
are also speculation and debates over Clausewitz’s relevance to contemporary conflict as well. In this essay, the author compares, contrasts and critically assesses the compe..ng views of Clausewitz’s applicability to modern warfare and analyses whether there is value for military leaders in studying his theories. In particular, he explores two authors’ views, Strachan’s The Direction of War and Kalder’s Inconclusive Wars, which offer conflicting arguments on Clausewitz’s relevance in these global times. He scrutinises these competing arguments and by supplemen..ng them with additional examples, affirms that Clausewitz’s theory is applicable and appropriate to contemporary military operations.

Our first issue for 2021—Vol 47, No. 1 is a  compilation of essays from students of our local Command and Staff Course (CSC) of the Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College (GKS CSC).

In this essay, the author argues that currently, while there are limitations in Artificial Intelligence (AI) decision-making, it is too late to prohibit the use of autonomous technologies for future warfare. This is due to the potential of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) as the next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) for both State and Non-State actors. However, the author feels that it is crucial to control the use of AWS. He argues this in his essay which is divided into three parts—firstly, he will define both AI and AWS, and suggests why current technical challenges of AI decision-making will not be a long-term limiting factor for its use by the military. Second, he will examine the applications and implications of AWS in future warfare. Thirdly, he will explain why the ‘game-changing' impacts of AWS to warfare will make it unlikely for international bans on AWS to succeed. Finally, he will propose some mitigating measures to control the use of AWS.

In this essay, the author argues for the proliferation of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) in projecting air power in 2035, and highlights the concerns involved. The author first describes the likely security landscape in the years ahead. Next, he goes on to highlight the trends of UCAVs and the reasons why they will become even more relevant in the future. The author also examines the controversies involved in conducting UCAV operations, which may impede the adoption of UCAV systems. Finally, the author analyses the implications of such trends on Singapore, in particular.

We wrap up 2020 for Vol 46, No. 2 with a compilation of essays from various sources—students from our local Command and Staff Course (CSC) of the Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College (GKS CSC) as well as from an overseas CSC, the United States Air Command and Staff College. We are also featuring an ad hoc essay submitted about Swarm Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). In addition, there is also an essay from a Senior Analyst from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and another from a Staff Officer of the Ministry of Education. Both authors had pursued a Master’s Programme at RSIS.

According to the author, autonomous technology is increasingly adopted by the various military forces around the world. In fact, there is a wide proliferation of robots which are being used to replace humans for many tasks, even in the battlefield. However, the author feels that the adoption of autonomous technology creates a distinct distance between the ‘operator’ and his targets and has moral implications. In his essay, the author first highlights the trends in war. He then details the advent of autonomous technologies. He further adds that there is a role and place for both autonomous and manned systems in the future battlefield. He feels that the key is to strike a balance and be able to get the best out of each. While an autonomous system might be able keep a human out of harm's way, there is a possibility that using an autonomous system can blind us to war and the real destruction it brings. The main drawback of using autonomous systems is that it may become easy to wage wars, thereby treading into moral and ethical issues. The author concludes however that it is the human element that is still crucial in the final outcome between autonomous and manned systems.

According to the author, hybrid entities are state-sponsored groups which possess training, discipline and equipment, like state militaries. Where these groups lack high end equipment (e.g. tanks, aircraft), they compensate with asymmetric tactics of operating in urban environment and exploiting lawfare. When faced with such a hybrid entity, modern militaries can learn from the enemy and employ a mix of conventional and unconventional forces. In this essay, the author argues for modern militaries to employ unconventional ‘plain clothes’ operatives for intelligence and Information Operations, and for conventional forces to employ smaller yet tighter air-land forces. The author feels that the efficient way to fight hybrid entities is the use of hybrid methods to fight fire with fire.

In this essay, the authors first examined the imperative of maritime sense-making in Singapore’s context. Despite its importance, maritime sense-making is not a topic that has been discussed robustly before. Therefore, the authors sought to elaborate what maritime sense-making entails, and how it is conducted by the Singapore Maritime Crisis Centre today. The authors then examined what big data analytics is, and the possibilities and challenges in unlocking the potential that big data analytics offer for sense-making in the maritime domain. 


We are excited to present our new volume from students of the various courses from the schools in SAFTI Military Institute – the Command and Staff Course (CSC) from the Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College (GKS CSC)!

This essay examines the applications of robots in future wars and analyses the possibility of totally removing humans from war. Robots can enable unmanned warfare to complement areas where human capabilities are limited. The shift from industrial war to Low-Intensity Conflicts (LIC) also favours the deployment of robots. But, there are substantial counter-arguments raised against the proliferation of war robots. These include high-profile incidents of catastrophic unmanned system failures pointing to the limitations of current robotic technology as well as the increasingly blurred line between unmanned weapon systems and conventional weapons. Beyond technical and tactical constraints, there are also moral and ethical issues on the deployment of weaponised robots. This essay therefore posits that humans will not be obsolete in robotics warfare.

In this article, the authors first accounted for how Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have developed over
time, before describing the current trends in the development of UAVs and the potential for UAVs in the modern context. The authors then discussed the various threats that UAVs pose to Singapore’s national security and sovereignty. They suggested several additional recommendations for Singapore to address the challenges of managing UAVs, but concluded by highlighting the potential of UAVs to be utilised to augment the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) operations.

In this essay, the author is not attempting to redefine deterrence but to encourage readers to consider the notion of acting before deterrence—through dissuasion. So what constitutes dissuasion and why consider it? The author feels that similar to deterrence, there is no direct answer as each country has its own set of unique security challenges and capabilities. Furthermore, the issue is made more complex as nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers employ different strategies. So, in this essay, the author attempts to: (1) elucidate the limitations of deterrence theory, (2) establish a coherent trend of elements that help define the concept of dissuasion, and (3) adapt them to the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)’s defence policy. He first begins by analysing the limitations of classical (rational) deterrence theory and its modern derivatives in the security landscape of tomorrow. He then explores the interpretations of dissuasion today and how they can be applied. Finally, the author develops what dissuasion as a strategic concept means for Singapore and how the SAF can meld dissuasion into deterrence thinking.

We are excited to present, under the new rebranded POINTER, the first compilation of essays from students of the various courses from the schools in SAFTI Military Institute – the Command and Staff Course (CSC) from the Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College (GKS CSC) and the Joint Senior Leadership Course (JSLC) from the SAF Warrant Officer School (SAFWOS) in the Specialist and Warrant Officer Institute (SWI).

For the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to always stand ready to be called to the defence of Singapore and her interests, it has to take threat assessments seriously. The process of formulating those threat assessments, and the decisions taken on follow-up actions are, however, fraught with challenges. History has provided one too many case studies where threat assessments had turned into self-fulfilling prophecies. Singapore can ill afford the price for such a scenario where spirals of fear and hostility lead us down the path to war. In this essay, the author seeks to elucidate the challenges that beset the process of threat assessment and then explain how even if the challenges are overcome, circumstances can still cause it to turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Finally, the author explores potential strategies that the SAF can apply to mitigate the danger of threat assessments becoming self-fulfilling prophecies.

In this essay, the author seeks to provide the reader with a quick introduction to intelligence, as a
springboard for him to think about how his work could be supported by intelligence, as well as to present him with a foundational understanding of the intelligence cycle and analytic techniques. The author feels that in the future, advances in technology will greatly increase the reach and volume of intelligence, posing new opportunities and challenges. At the same time, any adversary waging hybrid warfare can be expected to do it by presenting more variables, unpredictability, contradictions and acts of deception to try to paralyse our intelligence and decision-making. According to the author, military officers would do well to gain a better understanding of the possibilities and pitfalls of military intelligence, the techniques and technology involved and the lessons that history has to offer. Ultimately, a better understanding of how to grasp and exploit intelligence will be critical to operational success.

For the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), training is an essential function to ensure that it remains a strong and
respected force in the region. It has often relied on technology in training to overcome manpower and land
constraints. The Multi-Mission Range Complex (MMRC) is one such innovation conceptualised to provide training
realism while overcoming these constraints. With its emphasis on technology, the SAF is at the forefront of
simulation training. Augmented Reality (AR) is a technology that can benefit the training community by improving
not only the competencies of already skilled personnel, but also that of trainees who may lack knowledge and
experience. Popularised by Pokémon GO, it is one of the technologies that have been identified to have a
significant impact in 2017. AR enhances what we see, hear, feel and smell by adding graphics, sounds, haptic
feedback and smell to the natural world as it exists. With the technological barriers of AR decreasing, it has become
an attractive technology that the military can consider in training and operations. This essay explores the
possibilities of adopting AR for military training. It will first delve into AR and then look into the advantages offered
in the area of training. It will next explore AR uses for the military before focusing on how we can make AR a key
enabler for Army maintenance training by considering ‘Man’, ‘Methods’ and ‘Material’.

The robotics revolution offers new ways of warfighting through co-operative robotics including swarm and multi-agent systems resulting in swarm warfare. The essence of swarm warfare combines the highly decentralised nature of melee combat with the mobility of manoeuvre warfare. Underlying the ability to fight in a decentralised manner is a high degree of organisation that allows many individual agents to operate collectively—the concept of disaggregation. For the successful implementation of swarm, the enabling technological components are co-operation, autonomy and network. Swarm warfare can increase operational effectiveness and efficiency by fighting with mass and enable game changing warfighting such as Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T). Technological obstacles in communication and networks, software and autonomous logic developments, as well as cultural barriers related to system safety and ethical issues will need to be addressed. The authors feel that to accelerate adoption of the swarm innovation, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) can address cultural and bureaucratic factors.

This essay sets out to establish lessons learnt from Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) during the Cuban Missile Crisis. One is the significant impact of IMINT on the strategic decisions behind the blockade on Cuba as well as the planning of eventual air strikes. The author also highlights that this impact was a huge risk once the over-reliance on IMINT and the deficiency of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) were understood. From the analysis of a ‘secret low-level photographic operation’ codenamed Operation Blue Moon, the author states that the successful collection of low-level aerial photography over Cuba was far from well-planned. But, he felt that the most crucial lesson comes from observing the behaviour and interactions between the actors responsible for the planning, authorisation, collection, analysis and consumption of intelligence. Even after fifty years, the crisis represents not only an important moment of the Cold War, but also a guide on the management of intelligence in general.

March 2023

February 2023

November 2022

October 2022

August 2022

June 2022

May 2022

April 2022

March 2022

February 2022

January 2022

October 2021

September 2021

Vol.47 No.1

March 2021

February 2021

POINTER is the official journal of the Singapore Armed Forces. It is a non-profit, quarterly publication that is circulated to more than 10,000 MINDEF/SAF officers and various foreign military and defence institutions. POINTER aims to engage, educate and promote professional reading among SAF officers, and encourage them to think about, debate and discuss professional military issues. 

POINTER’s staple of publications includes journals, monographs and supplements. We leverage on the power of vast domestic and international network of ideas spanning the military-academic-scientific-industrial nexus for quality articles. SAF officers and both local and international defence experts and eminent thinkers of diverse fields are welcome to contribute articles for POINTER publication.

Defence Psychology: Empowering People, Enhancing Performance

DEFENDING OUR CYBERSPACE

Republic of Singapore Navy 50th Anniversary

SAF Medical Corps 50th Anniversary

Beyond the Horizon: Forging the Future RSAF

RSAF Through 50 Years of Nation-Building

One Of A Kind (2nd Edition)

The RSAF Journey - Voices from the Past, Present and Future

Fires: Tempering Of Steel

Leading in the Third Generation SAF: A Reader for Leadership Development

The Information Fusion Centre:  Challenges and Perspectives

Called to Lead: A Reader For Aspiring SAF Leaders

The SAF Professional Reading Programme (4th Edition)

On Staff Work

On Command

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